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ETHICS AND UNCERTAINTY: 
THE GUEST EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION 
– Tomasz Żuradzki –
Until very recently, normative theorizing in ethics was frequently conduct-
ed without even mentioning uncertainty. Just a few years ago, Sven Ove Hansson 
described this state of affairs with the slogan: “Ethics still lives in a Newtonian 
world.”1 In the new Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability, David McCarthy 
writes that “mainstream moral philosophy has not been much concerned with 
probability,” understanding probability as “the best-known tool for thinking
about uncertainty.”2 This special predilection for certainty in ethics was surprising 
since most decisions or evaluations are made both by individuals and policy- 
-makers through the fog of a widely understood uncertainty that includes risk, 
ignorance, indeterminacy. Therefore, the main task of this special issue and inter-
national essay prize competition is to encourage philosophers to rethink the 
standard paradigm in ethics by redirecting discussions about ethical questions to 
problems involving different kinds of uncertainty when an individual or a policy 
maker does not have access to or knowledge about (for example): the relevant 
facts, the consequences of decisions, the identity of people involved, other peo-
ple’s or her own preferences and decisions, the individuation of actions, the onto-
logical and moral status of some beings, the relevant normative doctrines or value 
scales etc. Since there has recently been growing interest in topics related to ethics 
and decision making under uncertainty,3 we hope the papers in this issue 
of Diametros will supplement some other new publications about the relevance of 
different kinds of uncertainty for ethics, either on a theoretical level (e.g. the recent 
symposium on decision theory in Ethics),4 or on a practical level (e.g. the recent 
symposium on the benefit/risk ratio challenge in clinical research in the Journal of 
1 Hansson (2003): 291. 
2 McCarthy (2016): 705. 
3 E.g. in the latest edition of the Philosopher’s Annual (2017), a collection of the ten best articles 
published in philosophy each year, both articles in ethics concern problems involving uncertainty: 
Bovens (2016) and Voorhoeve, Floeurbaey (2016). See also earlier landmark works on ethics and 
uncertainty by John Harsanyi, John Rawls, John Broome, Włodek Rabinowicz, among others.  
4 Buchak (2017a); Lazar (2017a); Tenenbaum (2017); Williams (2017). 
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Medical Ethics).5 Selecting the winners of the international essay prize competition 
was extremely difficult and the editors of Diametros decided to award three first 
prizes (6000 PLN each) to Piotr Bystranowski for the paper “Retributivism, 
Consequentialism, and the Risk of Punishing the Innocent: The Troublesome Case 
of Proxy Crimes,” to Mariam Thalos for the paper “Expectational v. Instrumental 
Reasoning: What Statistics Contributes to Practical Reasoning,” and to John R. 
Welch for the paper “Coping with Ethical Uncertainty.” 
In the first paper of this issue of Diametros, Jonathan Baron argues that 
probability provides a conceptual foundation for dealing with uncertainty and 
that probability based on personal degree of belief “allows us to make sense of the 
idea that unique events have probabilities.” He advises deciding on our best 
judgments on probability and allows only a very few exceptions from this rule, for 
example when consequences depend on our judgment itself or when we have 
good reason to think that our judgment is biased in a particular direction. Finally, 
discussing some practical examples, he critically analyses decision rules that do 
not use probability, e.g. the presumption of innocence and the precautionary prin-
ciple, among others. 
Piotr Bystranowski’s paper – the joint winner of the international essay 
prize competition – addresses the differences between retributivism and conse-
quentialism in the context of unintentionally punishing the innocent. Retributiv-
ism reveals a strong aversion towards punishing the innocent and requires a high 
evidentiary threshold in criminal law; consequentialism agrees for the relaxation 
of a high standard of proof if it may generate better consequences overall. The dif-
ference between these views is discussed in the context of proxy crimes that are 
introduced when the lawmaker decides to criminalize the suspicious behaviour 
itself, in situations when some behaviour indicates that an individual may have 
committed a crime but there is uncertainty as to whether the court would treat 
evidence sufficient for conviction (e.g. illegal gratuities or possession of drugs over 
the specified quantity). Bystranowski argues that proxy crimes are very much 
more troublesome for retributivism if it adopts a substantive reading of the pre-
sumption of innocence since individuals who commit proxy crimes may not be 
punishment-worthy. 
Sven Ove Hannson’s paper distinguishes two meaning of the word “uncer-
tainty”: epistemic (“something is not known by the agent”) and agential (“some-
thing has not been decided by the agent”). It analyses cases when it is unclear for 
an agent whether or not she presently has control over her own future actions, as 
5 See, e.g.: Buchak (2017b); Eyal (2017); Hare (2017); Kamm (2017); Kumar (2017); Wilker (2017). 
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in this simple example: “Can I open the box of chocolates and take just one single 
piece?” Hansson claims that there is a sensible pragmatic solution to this type of 
situation that maximizes the agent’s chances of success: an agent should try “to 
look at herself from the outside, and choose the control or no-control approach in 
the way that a benevolent observer would have recommended.” 
Keith Hyams discusses when, according to luck egalitarians, inequalities 
may be just. In the Dworkinian approach (hypothetical choice) they are just when 
they arise either from chosen risks or from risks against which agents would not 
have insured themselves. In the Cohenian approach (actual choice) they are just to 
the extent that they eventuate from actual choices, including actual choices to take 
risks. Hyams argues that this first approach is better, and introduces a “two-stage 
model” that distinguishes, “first, whether or not the choice to take a risk ought to 
be treated as an inequality-justifying event, and second, separately, whether or not 
the eventuation of the chosen risk ought to be treated as an inequality-justifying 
event.” He argues that not all chosen risks are inequality-justifying events. 
Sylvie Loriaux notices that relatively little attention has been paid to uncer-
tainties in global justice theories and she identifies four kinds of uncertainties that 
could potentially have an impact on the nature, content and very existence of 
global duties. The first type concerns the real or possible causes of global injustices 
and this uncertainty stems from the impossibility of establishing that the present 
state of global injustice has been caused in the past or by the existing global insti-
tutional order. The second type comes from uncertainty about the real and possi-
ble consequences of alternative courses of action, in particular, which actions 
could work in the context of international humanitarian or development aid. The 
third concerns the ‘imperfect’ character of certain global duties and stems from 
uncertainty how to allocate the duties corresponding to so-called social and eco-
nomic human rights, or the impossibility of determining at present what role par-
ticular global actors should play in the pursuit of global justice. The final type is 
related to the anarchical character of the international sphere, and stems from the 
impossibility of predicting how other states will behave.  
Kristin Shrader-Frechette uses recent research on diesel particulates to 
demonstrate that some researchers and governmental agencies mischaracterize 
either situations of decision-theoretic mathematical or scientific uncertainty 
(defined in terms of purely-subjective probabilities) as situations of risk (defined 
in terms of reliable, often frequency-based, probabilities), or situations of risk as 
those of uncertainty. As an example of this second mischaracterization, Shrader- 
-Frechette highlights the methodological flaws in the US Environmental Protection 
Agency who characterize confirmed, quantifiable, severe diesel-vehicle-exhaust 
Tomasz Żuradzki ◦ Ethics and Uncertainty. The Guest Editor’s Introduction 
 4 
risks as uncertain, and treats this risk analogically, for example, to thousand-year 
predictions of future terrorist attacks at dangerous radiological sites. This mistake 
contributes to inadequate regulation and completely preventable, diesel-induced 
deaths. The paper concludes by outlining two normative strategies for curbing 
misrepresentations of risk or uncertainty, and aims to demonstrate that epistemol-
ogy and philosophy of science should not be divorced from real-world ethics.  
Miriam Thalos’ paper – the joint winner of the international essay prize 
competition – highlights the fact that risk-numericalizing theories of decision (that 
is, utility theories that offer numericalized representations of risk) are inadequate 
as instrumental theories of reasoning. Her starting point is the famous example by 
Paul Samuelson who reported that he once offered a colleague a win $200 / lose 
$100 wager on a fair coin toss. The colleague declined the bet, but declared a will-
ingness to accept 100 such bets together. Samuelson argued that this pair of choic-
es was inconsistent and his colleague ought to accept such a bundle if (and only if) 
he is willing to take each bet in the bundle individually. In her paper, Thalos 
argues that this sort of consistency is not worth having: “some sequences are ac-
ceptable, even if none of the single plays are individually acceptable” and vice 
versa “some sequences are unacceptable despite each of its individual plays being 
individually acceptable.”6 
In the last paper in this issue of Diametros, John R. Welch – the joint winner 
of the international essay prize competition – recalls Kant’s life-saving lie, where 
an agent doubts “whether it would be a crime to lie to a murderer who asked us 
whether a friend of ours whom he is pursuing has taken refuge in our house.” In 
order to calculate the expected utilities of lying and telling the truth, the agent 
would need to know the probability that the murderer believes the agent and the 
utilities of the various outcomes. And this is, of course, impossible in any similar 
real-life situation. Nevertheless, Welch argues that there is a decision-theoretic 
approach that has a fighting chance of being applied in conditions of information 
poverty. To apply it, the concept of probability must be generalized as plausibility 
and that of expected utility as plausibilistic expectation. Welch argues that his ap-
proach is able to cope with the uncertainty endemic to most ethical decision mak-
ing. He argues that both the deontologist and the consequentialist attempt to at-
tain some good, and they can both be understood as maximizers of plausibilistic 
expectation, although they aim at different types of goods.7 
                                                 
6 Cf. Lazar (2017). 
7 The editorial work on this issue of Diametros was partially supported by a grant of the Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education in Poland, National Programme for the Development of Humani-
ties, no. 0177/NPRH4/H3b/83/2016. 
Tomasz Żuradzki ◦ Ethics and Uncertainty. The Guest Editor’s Introduction 
 5 
References 
Broome J. (1991), Weighing Goods. Equality, Uncertainty and Time, Blackwell, Oxford. 
Buchak L. (2017a), “Taking Risks behind the Veil of Ignorance,” Ethics 127 (3): 610–644. 
Buchak L. (2017b), “Why High-Risk, Non-Expected-Utility-Maximising Gambles Can Be 
Rational and Beneficial: The Case of HIV Cure Studies,” Journal of Medical Ethics 
43 (2): 90–95. 
Dreier J. (2004), “Decision Theory and Morality,” [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, 
A.R. Mele, P. Rawling (eds), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 156–181. 
Eyal N. (2017), “How to Keep High-Risk Studies Ethical: Classifying Candidate Solu-
tions,” Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (2): 74–77. 
Hansson S.O. (2003), “Ethical Criteria of Risk Acceptance,” Erkenntnis 59 (3): 291–309. 
Hare C. (2017), “Risk and Radical Uncertainty in HIV Research,” Journal of Medical Ethics 
43 (2): 87–89. 
Kamm F.M. (2017), “The Morality of Risks in Research: Reflections on Kumar,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 43 (2): 128–131. 
Kumar R. (2017), “Contractualist Reasoning, HIV Cure Clinical Trials, and the Moral 
(Ir)Relevance Of the Risk/Benefit Ratio,” Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (2): 124–127. 
Lazar S. (2017a), “Deontological Decision Theory and Agent-Centered Options,” Ethics 
127 (3): 579–609. 
Lazar S. (2017b), “Anton’s Game: Deontological Decision Theory for an Iterated Decision 
Problem,” Utilitas 29 (1): 88–109. 
McCarthy D. (2016), “Probability in Ethics,” [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and 
Probability, A. Hájek, C. Hitchcock (eds), Oxford University Press, Oxford: 705–737. 
Rawls J. (2003), A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA). 
Tenenbaum S. (2017), “Action, Deontology, and Risk: Against the Multiplicative Model,” 
Ethics 127 (3): 674–707. 
Voorhoeve A., Fleurbaey M. (2016), “Priority or Equality for Possible People?” Ethics 
126 (4): 929–954. 
Wikler D. (2017), “Must Research Benefit Human Subjects if it is to be Permissible?” Jour-
nal of Medical Ethics 43 (2): 114–117. 
Williams J.R.G. (2017), “Indeterminate Oughts,” Ethics 127 (3): 645–673. 
